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I. INTRODUCTION
“Wolde ye bothe eate your cake, and haue your cake?” This proverbial
saying dates to mediaeval times, first appearing in 1546.1 Despite the dramatic
change in language and spelling, the meaning of this phrase was never lost in
translation. One cannot simultaneously eat one’s cake and retain possession of
one’s cake. Both trademark owners and the Copyright Office want to have their
cake and eat it too. Trademark owners are trying to register their trademarks as
copyrights. The Copyright Office wants to deny such marks, but under a weak
lack of a creativity argument. Allowing trademarks to be registered as
copyrightable works violates the clear doctrines of the boundaries of protection
available in each area of intellectual property law.
There is no direct rule from Congress or the Supreme Court that a logo or
slogan cannot also be a copyrightable work. However, the necessary
intellectual property law boundaries are in place for good reason and support
the argument presented herein that a clearly demarcated line between copyright
and trademark protection must also be drawn. That clear demarcation should
1. Ben Zimmer, ‘Have Your Cake and Eat It Too’, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (Feb. 18,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/magazine/20FOB-onlanguage-t.html.
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be that an image originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright
may later meet trademark’s requirements and therefore be eligible for
concurrent trademark and copyright protection. However, a mark originally
created, exploited, and that functioned as a trademark cannot receive copyright
protection, concurrent or sequential, regardless of creativity. This is
determined by the applicant declaring during their copyright application that
the work seeking registration is not a designator of a source of goods under
penalty of fraud on the Copyright Office.2
In Section I, this comment discusses the differences between trademarks
and copyrights. In Section II, this comment analyzes the rules for copyrighting
trademarks and the arguments in favor of copyrighting trademarks. In Section
III, this comment addresses the problems of arguing that trademarks fail
copyright requirements for a lack of creativity. In Section IV, this comment
weighs the arguments against copyrighting trademarks. Section V concludes
by proposing a bright line rule for either Congress or the courts to adopt to
provide guidance that copyrighting a trademark is prohibited.
II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof” that is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
and is used in commerce “to identify and distinguish” the source of goods and
services.3 To be trademarked, the mark must either be distinctive or attain
secondary meaning through public association.4 Therefore, trademark law
protects the source identifying function of goods and services. Contrarily, a
copyright is an original work of authorship, such as a literary, musical,
audiovisual, or pictorial work, that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.5
Therefore, copyright protects the expressive content of works.
Copyright protection is granted by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause which grants Congress the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors … the
exclusive Right to their [] Writings and Discoveries.”6 Copyright protection is
designed to incentivize authors to create creative works. In 1879, the Court
distinguished copyright and trademark protection when the Supreme Court

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) (2008); 17 U.S.C. § 506(e) (2008).
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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ruled that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress any power to regulate
trademarks not used in commerce.7
In contrast, Trademark protection is granted by the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause which grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
… among the several States ….”8 Trademark protection is designed to ensure
consumers are informed as to the source of the goods they purchase.9
Moreover, for famous trademarks, protection encompasses the likelihood of
harm caused by the blurring or tarnishing caused by a knock-off mark
regardless of “likely confusion, [] competition, or [] actual economic injury.”10
Copyright and trademark protection were created for different purposes and
therefore have different protections and limitations. Thus, it is no surprise that
the boundaries between the two have blurred.
III. THE RULES FOR COPYRIGHTING TRADEMARKS AND THE ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR THEREOF
What is required for something to be creative? The Compendium, the
Copyright Office’s administrative manual, Section 913.1 states “[a] visual art
work that is used as a trademark, logo, or label may be registered if it satisfies
‘the requisite qualifications for copyright.’”11 The Copyright Act’s enumerated
categories of works of authorships is broad enough to cover most trademarks.
Also, fixation is not a barrier for trademarks seeking copyright protection so
long as the trademark has been drawn, recorded, or computer generated
Therefore, to copyright a trademark, copyright’s originality requirement is the
last element. Copyright’s originality standard requires a minimally creative
work that is not copied. However, creativity is never defined in the Copyright
Act.12 Given the difficulty in defining and recognizing creativity, over a
century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes warned that “[i]t would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.”13 Therefore, today, copyright’s creativity
requirements remain minimal.
In Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., the Court ruled that a work
need only an “extremely low” amount of creativity.14 In fact, Feist held that
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1879).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Practices § 913.1 (3d. ed. 2017).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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“[t]he vast majority of works make [copyright] grade quite easily.”15 Moreover,
elements of a work that are not copyrightable in themselves, may be
copyrightable if arranged in an original way.16 Therefore, copyright’s creativity
requirements are generally not a barrier for marks seeking copyright
registration.
However, an arrangement of individually, not copyrightable elements
cannot be “so commonplace that it has come to be expected,” such as listing
something in alphabetical order.17 Moreover, the Compendium Section 906.01
reads “a work that merely consists of common geometric shapes [is not
registrable] unless the author’s use of those shapes results in a work that, as a
whole, is sufficiently creative.”18 There are examples in Section 906.01 of
common geometric shapes arranged in an insufficiently creative manner.19
However, these examples are not insightful as these are clearly uncreative
marks.20 Additionally, Section 913.1, which states that trademarks may be
copyrighted, further states that the Copyright Office “typically refuses to
register trademarks, logos, or labels that consist of only … [w]ording … [m]ere
spatial placement or format of trademark, logo, or label elements; [or]
[u]ncopyrightable use of color, frames, borders, or differently sized font …
either standing alone or in combination.”21
Therefore, given the Compendium’s language, the Compendium’s
creativity standards for trademarks and logos, especially those consisting of
geometric shapes, (geometric trademarks) are much more difficult than the
standard proscribed in Feist. Despite this inconsistency between the federal
courts and the Copyright Office, trademarks owners have still been trying to
register their trademarks with the Copyright Office. In trademark owners’
view, trademarks are original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium
of expression. Thus, trademarks should be copyrightable, especially if the
counterargument is a lack of an extremely low amount of creativity. Moreover,
proponents of copyrighting trademarks will likely point to the current overlap
between copyright and trademark protection.
In 1934, the court found that the Frank Merriwell character “[was] closely
identified in the public mind with the work of a particular author, [and was
protectable] . . .. even after the expiration of the copyright, unless adequate

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a compilation).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 363.
U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Practices § 906.1 (3d. ed. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Compendium (Third) § 913.1.
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explanation is given to guard against mistake.”22 In 1962, in Planters Nut &
Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
declared that copyright and trademark protection is available for a fanciful
picture of a humanized peanut used as a design mark to identify and distinguish
the source of peanuts.23
In Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales, Inc., the publisher of the
“Peter Rabbit” books sued a competitor publishing versions of Peter Rabbit that
were in the public domain, and thus, no longer protected by copyright law.24
However, plaintiff brought trademark infringement claims for the cover
illustrations and eight drawings of characters from the “Peter Rabbit” books.25
Despite being sequential, rather than overlapping protection, the court held that
“[t]he fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the public
domain should not preclude protection under the trademark laws so long as it
is shown to have acquired independent trademark significance, identifying in
some way the source or sponsorship of the goods.”26
In Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., the owners of the
Barney character successfully brought copyright and trademark infringement
claims against a costume rental company for renting “look-alike costumes that
children allegedly believe are in fact Barney.”27 Walt Disney is particularly
aggressive in seeking concurrent copyright and trademark protection. For
example, in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, Disney brought copyright and trade
dress claims against a vendor selling graphic depictions of Mickey Mouse.28 In
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, regarding several Disney characters
including Mickey Mouse, the court noted that Disney “devoted considerable
effort and resources to developing a recognition of [Mickey Mouse], and
exploiting its value in numerous ways.”29
When Mickey Mouse was created as a cartoon and fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, Mickey Mouse was copyrightable.30 As time passed,
Mickey Mouse became much more than a cartoon character. Mickey Mouse
became a source identifying function. The public now associates Mickey
Mouse’s likeness with Walt Disney, assuming his presence means Disney
22.
23.
1962).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
Planters Nut & Chocolate Company v. Crown Nut Company, Inc., 305 F.2d 916, (C.C.P.A
Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1196.
Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001).
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1988).
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 113.
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produced, sponsored, or approved any product Mickey Mouse appears on.
Thus, Mickey Mouse earned trademark protection despite originally
functioning as a copyright.31 Trademark owners, therefore, can argue that
concurrent and sequential trademark and copyright protection exists. Further,
the Copyright Office overstepped its authority by creating a more stringent
creativity standard for geometric trademarks, violating the proscribed
extremely low creativity threshold set forth in Feist.32
IV. WHY ARGUING THAT TRADEMARKS FAIL THE COPYRIGHT REQUIREMENT
BECAUSE THEY LACK CREATIVITY IS A PROBLEM
Another argument in favor of copyrighting trademarks is that the difference
between the Copyright Office’s creativity standard for geometric trademarks
and Feist’s extremely low standard has recently resulted in numerous
controversial and inconsistent decisions by the Copyright Office. For example,
the Copyright Office Review Board (CORB), the appellate body of the
Copyright Office, denied copyright registration to the Union des Associations
Européennes de Football’s (UEFA) Starball logo for insufficient creativity.33
The Starball is a two-dimensional artwork consisting of black curved stars and
white polygons intended to appear as a three-dimensional soccer ball.34
UEFA argued that while typical geometric shapes are not copyrightable,
the stars and polygons used in their artwork were not typical because they are
curved to appear as a soccer ball.35 CORB cited Compendium Section 906.1,
likening the Starball to white circles on a purple background.36 CORB’s higher
creativity demands regarding trademarks and logos is clear in its refusal to
register the UAC Triangle Design.37 Here, the Copyright Office concluded that
the selection and arrangement of geometric shapes lacked the sufficient
creativity because they “[we]re not arranged in a way that creates a new,
unfamiliar shape.”38 Surely, creating a new, unfamiliar shape would be
creative, but is far from Feist’s extremely low creativity threshold.

31. Walt Disney Co., 698 F. Supp. at 12.
32. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
33. United States Copyright Office Review Board, Second Request for Reconsideration for
Refusal to Register “The UEFA Champions League Starball Device”; Correspondence ID 12WP8WG4; SR 1-4149565625 (July 30, 2018).
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. United Stated Copyright Office Review Board, Second Request for Reconsideration for
Refusal to Register UAC Triangle Design; 5 Correspondence ID: 1-25K4EEH; SR 1-3120971803 (Jan.
31, 2018).
38. Id. at 5.
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Another clear example of the higher creativity demands regarding
trademarks and logos is the Copyright Office’s recent American Airlines
rulings. American Airlines tried to register a red, white, and blue-colored logo
that depicts the wings of an airplane and an eagle in flight.39 American Airlines
argued the logo was more than basic shapes because of its arrangement and
abstraction of those shapes.40 The Copyright Office ruled that the logo “falls
below the threshold for creativity” because it is “comprised of basic geometric
shapes.”41 CORB characterized the logo as a “dual-colored, curved trapezoid
with a bisecting, shaded and curved triangle” and that its “insignificant
variations in shape [or] … coloring… [do not] change [the work’s] character;
trapezoids, rectangles, and triangles are all basic geometric shapes.”42 Based
on CORB’s own language, American Airline’s logo combines creative,
uncommon geometric shapes and certainly meets Feist’s extremely low
creativity thresholds.
After receiving “a higher-quality, larger-format image of the Work that
depicted additional details,” the Copyright Office reversed its decision and
registered American Airline’s logo.43 In its decision, CORB stated that “[w]hen
examining a work for copyrightable authorship, the Copyright Office evaluates
only whether a work is sufficiently creative for copyright protection” and does
“not consider the time and effort used in creating a design, its novelty, aesthetic
appeal, or commercial value.”44 These are traditional factors in a trademark
analysis. Ultimately, CORB granted American Airline’s logo merely “thin”
copyright protection “against only virtually identical copying” because the
“quantum of originality is slight.”45
The problem with the Copyright Office’s recent decisions is that these
marks likely meet Feist’s extremely low creativity threshold, thereby creating
inconsistent rulings and tension with the federal courts. For example, cases
before and after Feist have found that the combination of geometric shapes
contain sufficient creativity and merit copyright protection.
In Titlecraft Inc., v. NFL, the court held that the National Football League’s
(NFL) trophy for its annual Super Bowl champion is copyrightable because

39. U.S. Copyright Office Review, Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register
American Airlines Flight Symbol; Correspondence ID: 1-28H4ZFK; SR#: 1-3537494381 (Jan 8.
2018).
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. Id. at 4.
43. United States Copyright Office Review Board, Registration Decision Regarding American
Airlines Flight Symbol; 5, 7, Correspondence ID 1-28H4ZFK; SR 1-3537494381 (Dec. 7, 2018).
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 6 citing Beaudin v. Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., 95 F.3d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1996).
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“the combination of uncopyrightable elements in an original way renders the
trophy appropriate for copyright protection.”46 The court rejected the argument
that the trophy was not copyrightable because it is merely a football on top of
a base because “at some level of abstraction, all objects are combinations of
geometric shapes; that does not mean they cannot be protected by copyright …
it is the trophy’s combination of the base, with the football on top, at a certain
angle, that is protectable….”47 The court likened the argument that the trophy
consists only of common geometric shapes to the argument that “‘there can be
no originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been used
somewhere in the past.’”48 The different creativity standards applied by federal
courts and the Copyright Office is problematic and must be realigned. Hopeful
copyright registrants must be aware of the requirements of copyright and
uniform decisions are vital to a fair copyright registration process.
V. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST COPYRIGHTING TRADEMARKS
Although a geometric trademark may be sufficiently creative, this does not
mean it should be copyrightable. The examples of concurrent or sequential
copyright and trademark protection are limited to cartoon characters. As the
court mentioned, “[d]ual protection under copyright and trademark laws is
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters.”49 The
previously mentioned cartoon characters all met the copyright requirements—
were originally created, were exploited, and functioned as copyrights—and
then later met the trademark’s requirements. None of the previously mentioned
cartoon characters were originally created, exploited, or functioned as
trademarks that later sought copyright protection. As copyright and trademark
protection overlap, they provide more protection than is necessary to satisfy the
objectives of each protection.
Congress and the Supreme Court created boundaries for each form of
intellectual property to limit overprotection. Providing more protection than is
necessary harms the public, contrary to the purpose of intellectual property
protection. For example, copyright protection is earned as soon as the creative,
original mark is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, whereas a trademark
must be used in interstate commerce.50 Therefore, if a trademark owner can
protect their mark under copyright law, they can warehouse the mark from the
public, as copyright has no use in commerce requirement. Additionally, under
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Titlecraft, Inc. v. NFL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134367, 1, 12-13 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 12-13 citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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a copyright rather than trademark infringement claim, one need not prove
likelihood of confusion, which is designed to protect the public.51
Also, any fair use defense typically available under copyright law would be
eliminated as there is no fair use of another’s trademark. Fair use is a
foundational element of the societal bargain in copyright law that allows the
public to make fair use of works for certain purposes despite being a
copyrighted work.52 Moreover, copyrighting trademarks and thereby treating
trademarks as expressive speech implicates significant First Amendment
concerns. A trademark can prevent the speech of another if there is a likelihood
of confusion. If one can trademark an expressive phrase that should be
protected under copyright, one could prohibit another’s speech through
trademark law without any fair use defenses. As of 2017, it is more difficult to
deny political, expressive phrases that are attempting to gain trademark
protection, especially after the Court equivocated trademark and copyrights in
the same case.53
Furthermore, the expanded scope of what can be trademarked and
copyright’s expanded length of protection is concerning. In 1998, copyright
protection was extended through the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).54
Under the CTEA, despite the constitutionality being challenged, Congress
increased the length of copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy
years, and included a retroactive extension for all pre-existing copyrights.55
In contrast, trademark protection always lasted, so long as the mark was
used in interstate commerce or until the mark became generic.56 Through
Congress and various decisions by the federal courts, federal trademark
protection has vastly expanded over the last several decades.57 In 1946,
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
52. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
53. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (ruling trademarks may not be denied for
being immoral, disparaging, or scandalous and conflated trademarks and copyrights by stating
“trademarks often have an expressive content … powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in
just a few words.”).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2002).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 776 (2003); see Symposium:
Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 781 (2003); Keith Gluck, The Birth of a Mouse, THE WALT DISNEY FAMILY
MUSEUM BLOG (Nov. 18, 2012), https://www.waltdisney.org/blog/birth-mouse (arguing that Congress
passed the CTEA to extend Mickey Mouse’s copyright as without the CTEA, Mickey Mouse’s
copyright would have expired in 2003, but will now last until 2023 despite being created in 1928.).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining abandonment); see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior
Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding generic marks are not eligible for
trademark protection).
57. Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).
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Congress expanded trademark law when it passed the Lanham Act, which
provides protection for unregistered marks.58 In 1955, Congress also passed
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which provides a dilution claim despite
no likelihood of confusion, even for non-competing and non-identical marks.59
Today, under trademark protection, companies can protect a source-identifying
color, source-identifying sounds, and even a restaurant’s theme.60
The Copyright Office should be more skeptical of not just geometric
trademarks, but any trademark trying to gain copyright protection. However,
the Copyright Office should not deny trademarks via an insufficient creativity
argument, but rather, for illegitimate extension of trademark protection through
copyright law and a necessary demarcation between the boundaries of
copyright and trademark law. Without a division, companies can circumvent
trademark protection’s bounds through copyright law. The following cases
illustrate the federal courts stance towards concurrent intellectual property
protection overall.
In Baker v. Selden, the Court held that copyright protection does not extend
to an idea itself, but only the expression of that idea.61 This core concept of
copyright law is called the idea/expression dichotomy or merger problem. The
plaintiff in Baker copyrighted his book describing his double-entry
bookkeeping system.62 However, the illustrations to exemplify the system were
not protectable under copyright law because they were ideas and examples of a
system.63 Despite the systems likely meeting copyright requirements, the Court
correctly ruled that the following are patentable, not copyrightable: ideas,
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operations, concepts, principles or
discoveries embodied in a copyright work.64
Despite not being copyrightable subject matter, these systems were ripe for
protection under a different form of intellectual property, patent law.65
Therefore, someone using the same system as Selden, even using the examples
provided in his copyrighted book, would not be infringing on Selden’s
copyright because the examples are necessary to enact the system. Thus, to

58. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1126 (1946).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1955).
60. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 158, 172 (1995) (protecting color);
see generally UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark “Sound Mark”
Examples, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/soundmarks/trademark-sound-mark-examples; Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (protecting a restaurant’s theme).
61. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
62. Id. at 101.
63. Id. at 103.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
65. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
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protect these examples under copyright law would be a backend route to protect
a system, which is the subject of patent, not copyright law.66 Essentially, the
ideas for how to carry out the system cannot be copyrightable. Moreover, the
underlying system in the work is not copyrightable subject matter and there is
a limited number of ways to express this creative and original idea. Therefore,
even if identically expressed, such expression does not warrant copyright
infringement because the expression of the idea is merged with the noncopyrightable idea, making the expression of that idea non-copyrightable as
well. Simply put, ideas and systems are patentable, not copyrightable.67
Additionally, in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, the Court faced
the problem of sequential protection between a patent and trademark.68 When
Marketing Display’s patent expired, TrafFix reverse engineered it and sold a
very similar product.69 Marketing Display sought trademark infringement, but
the Court ruled against Marketing Display’s plea for sequential protection.70
The Court considered public policy regarding creative, inventive works and
referred specifically to the right to copy.71 The Court stressed the nonfunctionality requirement for trademark protection and found that the
distinction between trademark’s non-functionality and patent’s utility
requirement must remain clearly demarcated.72 After making that distinction,
the Court rejected Marketing Display’s attempt to extend an expired patent’s
protection using trademark law73
Federal courts have directly expressed concerns with copyrighting
trademarks.74 For example, the Second Circuit stated the “[o]verextension of
trade dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and patent law
that are designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas. Consequently,
courts should proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered trade
dress protection so as not to undermine the objectives of these other laws.”75 In
Galerie v. Coffaro, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s trademark claim because
the plaintiff should have “brought [the claim] under the federal copyright, not

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 105.
Traffix Devices, Inc., v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 34-35.
Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.
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trademark, statute.”76 The Ninth Circuit addressed concurrent trademark and
copyright holding:
This [movie] clip is [not] a trademark … the [movie clip] … was clearly
covered by the Copyright Act … and the Lanham Act cannot be used
to circumvent copyright law. If material covered by copyright law has
passed into the public domain, it cannot then be protected by the
Lanham Act without rendering the Copyright Act a nullity.77
Likewise, in Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Communs., Inc., the court
rejected a trademark claim where copyright properly applied because otherwise
it “would simply transform every copyright action into a Lanham Act
action….”78 In EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos,
Inc., the court held that a song cannot be a trademark for itself as that “would
allow any copyright claim for infringement … to be converted [] into a Lanham
Act cause of action … [and] stretch the definition of trademark … too far [by]
… protecting the very essence of the song, an unwarranted extension into an
area already protected by copyright law.”79
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court
was again directly faced with the issue of sequential protection, denying an
attempt to extend copyright protection through trademark law.80 The plaintiff,
Twentieth Century Fox (Fox), alleged trademark infringement in a previously
copyrighted work that expired when Fox failed to renew its registration.81
Dastar edited Fox’s work and sold it at a lesser cost.82 The court rejected Fox’s
attempt to protect its work with trademark law after its copyright protection
expired.83 The Court defined a “mutant copyright,” as when a copyright owner
76. Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
77. See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364-1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a concurrent copyright
and trademark protection attempt for a pilot script. The court heard the copyright claim, but not the
trademark claim because doing so would expand trademark protection in a way “[in]consistent with
the Lanham Act’s purpose of preventing individuals from misleading the public by placing their
competitors’ work forward as their own.” The court specifically referred to the concurrent protection
problem by refusing “to expand the scope of the Lanham Act to cover cases in which the Federal
Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy.”).
78. Murray Hill Publications, Inc., v. ABC Communications, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761
(E.D. Mic. 1999).
79. EMI Catalogue Pshp. v. Hill, Holiday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 2000 U.S. App. Lexis
30761 18,19 (2d Cir. 2000).
80. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003).
81. Id. at 26-27.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 34-35.
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attempts to use trademark law to protect the previously copyrighted work.84
While Dastar overruled sequential protection for an expired copyright via
trademark law, it did not directly address concurrent protection.
While rare, there are marks that are concurrently copyrights and
trademarks, such as Mickey Mouse. Under Dastar, once Mickey Mouse’s
copyright expires, the right to copy him should pass in to the public domain.
Trademark protection after Mickey Mouse’s copyright expiration would create
a “mutant copyright.” In Dastar, Fox’s trademark claims were easy to reject
relative to Disney’s trademark rights in Mickey Mouse. Mickey Mouse
entering the public domain would create mass consumer confusion as any
company would be free to copy Mickey Mouse. This contradicts trademark’s
purpose of avoiding consumer confusion and free-riding another company’s
good will.
Dastar looks to balance the right to copy after a copyright’s expiration
against trademark’s perpetual protection so long as the mark is continually used
in interstate commerce and avoids becoming generic. Dastar finds that the
harm to the public and mark owners denied sequential protection are
outweighed by the public benefit received from the right to copy the work.85
Public policy supports the right to copy, but also supports protecting Mickey
Mouse as a trademark because his passing into the public domain would cause
consumer confusion and free-riding off Disney’s good will. However,
protecting Mickey Mouse as a trademark is contrary to Dastar’s holding against
sequential trademark protection after a copyright’s expiration. Therefore, while
Dastar resolved the issue of sequential protection, marks such as Mickey
Mouse that have concurrent trademark and copyright protection are left
stranded.
Dastar and these other cases look to maintain clear demarcations between
the scopes of intellectual property protection, and copyright and trademark
protection specifically. Otherwise, trademark protection can form into a mutant
copyright and eliminate the public’s right to copy, which is crucial to the
societal bargain, advancement of new creative works, and overall access to
knowledge. While Dastar resolved the issue of extending copyright protection
via trademark law, the reverse of Dastar, using copyright law to extend
trademark protection, must be regulated for the same policy concerns of Dastar.
Clear demarcations between other areas of intellectual property law exist for
good reason and for these same reasons a clear line between copyright and
trademark law is necessary. Without clear demarcations between copyright and
trademark law, the protection for creative works, whether trademark or
84. Id.
85. Id. at 35-36.
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copyright, may extend into absolute rights. For example, in Video Pipeline Inc.,
v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t., Inc., a federal district court held that copying
previews of Disney’s movies was copyright and trademark infringement
because Disney’s characters were both copyrights and trademarks.86 However,
the court enjoined not only showing the parts of the previews with the
trademarked characters, but the entire preview.87 This protected the entire work
through trademark law, despite trademarks appearing in only parts of the work.
Had the plaintiffs been required to use copyright protection, they would have
been required to show unauthorized use of their creative works that was
substantially similar to the original and that no infringement defenses were
available. A copyright infringement claim is far more difficult to prove than
the trademark claim that was used. Further, defendants are harmed if they
unnecessarily settle, enter licensing agreements, or stop using the work thereby
robbing the public, due to uncertain litigation concerns.
VI. TO TRADEMARK A COPYRIGHT, NOT COPYRIGHT A TRADEMARK, THAT IS
THE RULE
Trademark owners and the Copyright Office cannot have their cake and eat
it too. Trademark owners cannot also have copyright protection. The Copyright
Office cannot have an extremely low standard and then deny marks that clearly
meet this low standard. Cases that did not overrule overlapping intellectual
property protection deal with an overlap where different areas of intellectual
property protect different aspects. The cases not overruling concurrent
trademark and copyright protection deal with trademark protection for a mark
originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright that later
functioned as a trademark. Therefore, it is necessary to draw a line that an
image originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright may later
meet trademark’s requirements and therefore be eligible for concurrent
trademark and copyright protection. However, a mark originally created,
exploited, and that functioned as a trademark cannot also later receive copyright
protection.
To determine if a mark was originally created, exploited, and functioned as
a trademark or a copyright, the applicant must declare as part of the copyright
application process under 17 U.S.C. § 409 that the work seeking registration is
not a designator of a source of goods under penalty of fraud on the Copyright
Office. A knowingly fraudulent representation would lead to invalidation of
the copyright application if it is material—meaning of such a nature that it
86. Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 275 F. Supp. 2d 543, 564, 577 (D.N.J.
2003).
87. Id. at 564, 577.
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would have caused the Copyright Office to refuse registration.88 Failing to
notify the Copyright Office that the mark seeking registration is a trademark
would surely qualify as a material fraudulent representation that would
invalidate the copyright application because under the rule proposed herein a
mark that functions as a source identifier would never be granted copyright
protection.
This declaration removes the burden from the Copyright Office and any
third parties. Also, while this may result in concurrent copyright and then
trademark protection, this puts the burden on the applicant to use the work
seeking copyright registration as a copyrightable work, typically before any
trademark protection would be available. If said work meets copyright’s
minimal requirements and then later functions as a trademark, this is acceptable
so long as the work originally functioned as a copyright typically does—such
as expression aesthetic or artistic meaning. The mark functioning as a
copyright typically does benefit and enrich the public as copyright law
intended. If a mark is used or intended to be used as a source identifier without
first functioning as a copyrighted work, the mark was created, exploited, and
functions as a trademark. For such a mark, trademark protection alone should
apply without the potential for concurrent or sequential copyright protection.
However, a work originally created, exploited, or that functioned as a copyright
is one that is used or intended to be used to express some aesthetic, expressive,
or artistic meaning. For such a mark, copyright and then trademark protection,
even concurrent, is available.
Mickey Mouse, for example, would comport with this rule because Mickey
Mouse was originally created, exploited, and functioned as a copyright. Then,
only after time, Mickey Mouse functioned as a trademark and satisfied
trademark’s requirements. Mickey Mouse thus should be eligible for
concurrent copyright and trademark protection. Moreover, this rule comports
with Dastar in that it only allows for concurrent protection and disallows
sequential protection if the copyright does not seek trademark registration prior
to the copyright’s expiration or alleged trademark infringement. Therefore, the
copyright must seek trademark protection while the copyright protection is
valid. Such a mark cannot seek trademark registration after the copyright’s
expiration or after the alleged copyright infringement.
This rule demarcates clear boundaries between copyright and trademark
law and closes a circumvention of trademark law’s bounds through copyright
law, while not contradicting trademark’s purpose of avoiding consumer
confusion. No test is foolproof and the same holds true for this rule.
Specifically, a mark owner could originally create, exploit, and function a mark
88. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1).
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as a copyright to gain copyright protection all along, knowing the mark’s true
purpose is to serve as a trademark. If the mark meets copyright’s requirements
and then later meets trademark’s requirements, the mark would gain concurrent
copyright and trademark protection. However, defrauding the Copyright Office
is illegal and the minimum examinations by the Copyright Office will snuff out
bad faith registrations. Moreover, and most importantly, if the work’s creator
exploits the work as a copyright typically does, this inherently benefits and
enriches the public and comports with copyright law’s purpose.
The loss of a few images from the public domain—because such images
can comport with this rule and therefore be eligible for concurrent copyright
and trademark protection—is outweighed by the mass consumer confusion and
illegitimate free-riding that would result from longstanding trademarks such as
Mickey Mouse falling into the public domain due to Disney’s copyright
expiration. In fact, this exception to this proposed rule that allows concurrent
protection is not contrary to the purpose of the rule. The purpose of this rule is
to protect against copyrighting a trademark, not against granting trademark
protection to a copyright. This rule is designed to either prevent a trademark
originally created, exploited, and functioned as a trademark from also receiving
copyright protection, or to make such work also function and be exploited as a
copyright prior to being eligible for trademark protection.
The rule does not resolve the right to copy concerns of Dastar. Such
concerns are unavoidable without rendering Mickey Mouse into the public
domain, and further contradict trademark’s purpose of making the marketplace
fair, avoiding consumer confusion, and eliminating illegitimate free-riding.
Therefore, this rule balances over-extending trademark protection by
prohibiting copyrighting a trademark against trademark’s purposes, and
legitimate concurrent trademark and copyright protections for copyrights that
now serve a source identifying function.
If a work is originally created, exploited, and functioned simultaneously as
a copyright and a trademark, then copyright registration would be possible with
potential concurrent future trademark protection. For example, if a company
creates a character for an advertisement, so long as the character has some
expressive use, copyright protection is available. If this character later becomes
a source identifying function, the character can also be trademarked. A clear,
systematic approach is necessary. This rule allows for the enhancement of the
public domain, the maintenance of the incentive to create works that progress
the science and arts against marketplace fairness, and the avoidance of mass
consumer confusion and free-riding. The Supreme Court or Congress should
adopt the proposed rule herein to provide guidance to an unclear area of law
that, if left unattended, allows mark owners to undermine, circumvent, and
extend the boundaries of trademark law through copyright.

